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Consumer and Producer Influences in Agricultural Policy Formulation:  
Some Empirical Evidence 
 
Introduction 
 The political economy of agricultural protection (PEAP) literature has progressed along two 
distinct paradigms of the interactions among economic agents: the self-willed government (SWG) 
models and the clearing house government (CHG) models. The first approach assumes that the 
government is an autonomous unit maximizing a social welfare function. The CHG approach 
treats the political process as a clearing house where a relatively passive government redistributes 
resources among different interest groups. The earlier PEAP studies have viewed the 
protectionistic policies as being the outcomes of either altruistic motives or the self-interest 
motives. This study treats the two approaches as complementary.  This study investigates the 
primary determinants of agricultural protection across industrialized and developing countries. 
Our hypotheses are that consumers’ concerns regarding stable consumption patterns as well as 
producers’ pressure group characteristics play a prominent role in the determination of political 
market equilibrium in the agricultural sector. This methodology integrates development of 
theoretical and empirical analyses. Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1981) pair-wise non-nested J 
tests are used to analyze the relative influence of consumers and producers in policy formulation 
across countries.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
Consumer Model 
 It is postulated that the perceived benefits from consistent consumption patterns through 
stabilization of food prices translates into consumer preferences. These perceived benefits 
constitute the demand for intervention from the consumers. Since incomes and the size of risk in 
relation to income vary from society to society, this generates varying degrees of political 
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demand from consumers across countries. This section proposes an alternative hypothesis to 
explain this phenomenon as an extension of Foster and Rausser’s (1992, p. 17) and Gardner’s 
(1990, p. 20) suggestions. Consumers accept government intervention in the agricultural sector 
because of the consumption benefits accruing to them.1   The argument relates to the paradigm of 
the social concerns approach that groups seeking risk insurance are protected by the government. 
This motive has largely been ignored in the PEAP literature so far. This section stresses the need 
for an analysis that quantifies the linkages among food security, price stabilization and PEAP 
policies.  
 Assume the consumer derives utility from the consumption of two commodities, q1 and q2 , 
whose prices are p1 and p2. Let q1 be the staple food commodity in question (wheat) and q2 be a 
composite bundle of other commodities.  The consumer prefers a smooth consumption pattern 
over an erratic one.  In a stochastic environment where production and prices are fluctuating, the 
consumer is interested in meeting a target level of consumption.  Let the income of the consumer 
be y; and qˆ1 and qˆ2  be the minimum target consumption levels of q1 and q2.  It can also be 
assumed that both goods are substitutes to a certain extent only after the minimum requirements 
of both have been met.  If the consumption of q1 falls below the target level, then extreme 
discomfort occurs.  In terms of indirect utility function, v˜(p1 , p2 , y), which is twice differentiable 
within the feasible region with (v˜/pi) < 0, (v˜/y) > 0, and  2v˜/y2 ) < 0, where i = 1,2: 
 The consumer may be interested in a price stabilization policy that would alter the distribution of 
prices such that the probability of prices being higher than the critical level is reduced.  In this 
case, then, the expression for the indirect utility function becomes 
E v˜  
0
y/qˆ1
v g p1 dp1  vo 1 G
y
qˆ1 = 
0
y/qˆ1
vo p1, p2, y  b  g  p1 dp1
 
                                                           
11 This argument is postulated to transcend across developing as well as industrialized countries, albeit with varying 
degrees. 
v˜ =
vp1, p2, y if p1  yqˆ1
vo if p1 	 yqˆ1
.
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Note that now 
Using Taylor series approximation on both sides of the expected utility function,  
E[ v(p1 , p2 , y) ] =  v ( p1 , p2 , y - b), and taking expectations, an expression similar to Newberry 
and Stiglitz (1981) is obtained for the cash benefits to the consumers of price stabilization or the 
gains that would accrue from partial stabilization of the domestic market around p1 ):2  b
 (½) 1 
y[ 1 (Rc- ) -11 p1 /p12 - 1 (Rc- ) p1,y p1 .  Using the implicit function theorem, the 
consumer benefits can be expressed in terms of price and income elasticities of demand (, 	
 
Arrow-Pratt’s coefficient of relative risk aversion (Rc), Engel coefficients ( ), and the income of 
the consumer (y).  Ignoring the subscripts, then,  
b* =  {, ,Rc , y, , } where,  is a vector of other exogenous variables.  
 
Producer Model 
 A behavioral model of agricultural producers is developed following the CHG approach in the 
PEAP literature.  The political power of the producer group depends upon attributes such as their 
membership size, their efficiency at overcoming the free-rider problem and their incomes.  
Farmers’ investment in political influence for securing protection (k), their relative group size (n) 
and income level (w ), have been modeled explicitly into the traditional theory of profit 
maximizing firms.3  
 The price of the output is hypothesized to be influenced by the farmers’ lobbying activity, that is, 
p = p + (), where p is the mean of free-market price without intervention, 

                                                           
22 Analogous to food security, a case may also be made here for consumers’ social preferences to pay to support 
farmers because of the perceived virtues of country life. 
33 It is assumed that producers maximize their profits without taking into account the demand for protection coming 
from consumers such that the interaction term regarding the effects of level of expenditures of one group on that of 
the other can be ignored.  
G yqˆ1  0
y/qˆ1
g p1 dp1 = Pr p1 
y
qˆ1 = 1 where, 
y/qˆ1
 
g p1 dp1  0.
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 > 0 is the increase in price (subsidy) due to lobbying and  < 0 implies taxation of producers.4  
The amount of political support supplied in response to a given expenditure of time and 
resources by the group, K =i 1
n
ki,
 would depend upon a number of factors such as their number 
and wealth.  The farmer’s maximization problem can be written as:  

i=[p+(k,w,n,)]qi-c(qi)-ki . 
 
 The first-order conditions would imply that producers spend on lobbying as long as the last dollar 
spent brings about an increase in income of one dollar, that is, qi()=1.  Using the implicit 
function theorem, the producers’ maximization problem yields the expression for the indirect 
profit function: * =  (p, w, n, q).  Thus, the profits of agricultural producers are affected by the 
size (n) and wealth (w) of the group, the mean of the free-market price (p), and some other 
exogenous variables (). 
 
Politician’s Model 
 Government is assumed to choose the level of policy instrument, , so as to maximize an 
objective function defined over the indirect utility function of consumers (v*), the indirect profit 
function of producers (*) and the cost of the policy (m).  A government/politician’s optimization 
problem is defined as:  Max  U = U( v*, *, m), where U is the politician’s utility function for the 
staple food policy-making assumed to be separable, additive and strictly concave in its 
arguments.  It is further assumed that the politician’s preferences in the staple commodity policy 
are separable from other concerns.  
 To illustrate the effect on domestic consumers and producers assume that the cost of the policy, 
m, is constant.  Then, this equation implies that 
U/v 
U/  | m  const.   /v /
 .   
                                                           
44 The theory developed here focuses on a homogeneous commodity (q) with no substitution, and a small country 
case - in which the world price of the commodity is considered as given.  In this case, the border price can be 
substituted for the free-market price.  Moreover, it is consistent with the empirical analysis since the calculations of 
the dependent variable are also based upon these assumptions. 
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In other words, the politician will set the policy instrument level where the marginal rate of 
substitution of consumer’s interests for producer’s interests is equal to the trade-off between the 
producer’s and consumer’s interests due to a change in the policy instrument.   
 
Determinants of International Agricultural Protection 
 In this section, an attempt is made to empirically validate the results of the consumer, producer 
and policy-makers’ models using the data from 30 industrialized and developing countries for the 
period 1982-87 (USDA, 1990 and 1993).  The next subsection tests the significance of 
consumers’ food security concerns in the determination of protectionistic policies.  The OLS, GLS 
and pooled cross-section time-series (PCSTS) estimation techniques are used to fit the regression 
models with producer subsidy equivalents for wheat (PSEwheat) as the dependent variable.  In the 
PCSTS models, the data were corrected for both the cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and the 
time-series autocorrelation. 
 
Consumer Preferences 
 Model specification tests as well as graphical disposition (neither reported) suggest a non-linear 
relationship between the Engel coefficients and protection levels.  The Engel coefficients (in all 
forms) are found to be negatively correlated with the protection levels (Table 1).  The coefficient 
estimates are mostly statistically significant at one percent level.  As the share of food in 
household budget increases, as is the case in developing countries, the subsidies to the 
agricultural producers decline.  
 Another important variable identified in the theoretical model of consumers, the income 
elasticity of demand (), also had the expected negative sign and was statistically significant in 
all the regression models.  High income elasticity may also be expected to increase the marginal 
gains to consumers from food security.  The price elasticity of demand for wheat is also found to 
be negatively related to the protection level awarded to wheat farmers indicating that the higher 
the price elasticity of demand, the higher the consumers’ marginal gains from reduced prices.  As 
the per capita incomes of the nonfarm population increase, consumer welfare becomes less  
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Table 1.  Results for consumer interest models 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimation Technique: PCSTS PCSTS GLS OLS OLS OLS PCSTS PCSTS 
Engel Coefficient 7.248* 
(4.70) 
- 5.937* 
(4.27) 
- 6.247* 
(4.52) 
5.742* 
(3.83) 
-0.968* 
(-3.51) 
5.063* 
(2.98) 
(Engel Coefficient)2  -0.072* 
(-4.54) 
- -0.072* 
(-4.26) 
- -0.062* 
(4.25) 
-0.059* 
(-3.58) 
- -0.044** 
(-2.35) 
ln Engel - -27.817* 
(-3.77) 
- - - - - - 
Income Elasticity- Wheat - -60.478* 
(-4.18) 
-75.303* 
(-5.20) 
-29.787** 
(-2.43) 
-22.775** 
(-1.98) 
-25.817** 
(-2.17) 
-56.558* 
(-3.60) 
-51.388* 
(-2.68) 
Income Elasticity- Food -34.175 
(-0.95) 
- - - - - - - 
Price Elasticity- Wheat - - - - - - - -19.250 
(-1.05) 
Relative Risk- Aversion -108.430* 
(-3.93) 
- - -49.311* 
(-5.70) 
-78.638* 
(-3.70) 
-76.878* 
(-3.47) 
- -121.69* 
(-4.03) 
Per Capita Income (GNPC) - - 0.006* 
(5.76) 
- - - - - 
GNPC - Non-Farm  0.002* 
(4.14) 
- - - 0.004* 
(4.32) 
0.004* 
(4.38) 
- - 
Self-Sufficiency Rate  
- 
-0.079* 
(-3.754) 
-0.061** 
(-2.53) 
- - - -0.067* 
(-3.34) 
- 
Import Dependence - - - 0.221* 
(3.18) 
- 0.142** 
(2.04) 
- - 
Dummy:  Japan (DJ) - - - - 46.610* 
(3.84) 
- - - 
Intercept 53.851* 
(2.55) 
140.52* 
(6.108) 
-83.838* 
(-2.785) 
93.069* 
(8.64) 
-1.400 
(-0.05) 
1.632 
(0.06) 
76.473* 
(9.93) 
106* 
(5.53) 
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.36 0.51 0.42 0.51 0.48 0.34 0.37 
DF 174 176 174 176 173 173 176 174 
 
sensitive to changes in the wheat price.  The results presented here represent a first such attempt 
to explicitly include the income and price elasticities of demand in a cross-country analysis. 
 The relative risk aversion of consumers (Rc) is also found to be negatively correlated with wheat 
protection levels.  The coefficient estimates are highly significant in all the models.  Low income 
consumers in developing countries are more risk averse relative to their well-to-do counterparts 
in developed countries.  This supports the public interest interpretation (the SWG approach in the 
political economy literature) of the motives for government intervention in the agricultural 
sector.  Both variants of consumers’ income (GNPC and GNPC- Nonfarm) have the expected 
positive sign and are statistically significant at the one percent level.  The results support the 
view that society has an income elastic demand for assisting farmers.  
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 Among other measures of consumers’ food security concerns, the self-sufficiency rate had the 
correct negative sign and was significant at the one or five percent level, while import 
dependence, as expected, is observed to be positively correlated with the producer protection 
levels.  The binary variable used for Japan was also statistically significant.  The overall results 
of the analysis are very robust in that up to 51 percent variation in producer support is explained 
by consumers’ concerns alone.  All the variables suggested by the theoretical model (except the 
price elasticity of wheat demand) are highly statistically significant in explaining the protection 
levels. 
 
Producer Preferences 
 The empirical analysis in this subsection uses the pooled cross-section time-series (PCSTS) 
estimation to test the comparative static results of the theoretical model of producers.  As 
expected, the coefficients on group-size variables had a negative and statistically significant sign 
(Table 2).  The results support the group-size theories proposed by Olson (1965) and Becker 
(1983) that small groups tend to be more successful relative to large ones in obtaining political 
favors. 
 The share of agriculture in the gross domestic product (GDPAg) provides a close approximation 
of the relative wealth of farmers identified in the theoretical model.  The coefficients have the 
hypothesized negative sign and are significant.  Factor ratio (FACTOR) is used in the analysis as 
an index of the comparative advantage in agriculture.  It is defined as the ratio of arable land per 
farm worker to the average capital endowment per worker in the society.  The significant 
negative coefficients obtained in the regressions corroborate the findings reported in Honma and 
Hayami (1986a and 1986b) that, as the comparative advantage shifts away from agriculture, 
farmers are able to garner increased protection from imports.  The lagged world price of wheat 
(Pw,t-1) also has the expected negative sign. 
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Table 2.   Results for producer interest models 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Share of Agriculture in Labor Force -0.971* 
(-6.99) 
-0.021 
(-1.20) 
- -1.01* 
(-6.26) 
- - -1.259* 
(-10.0) 
Relative Share of Agriculture to             
Industry in Labor Force 
- - - - -11.304* 
(-3.77) 
- - 
Share of Agriculture in GDP (log) - - -11.850** 
(-2.52) 
- - -22.423* 
(-5.92) 
- 
Factor Ratio -7.909* 
(-4.11) 
-7.525* 
(-3.93) 
-5.898** 
(-2.25) 
-7.836* 
(-3.58) 
-6.177* 
(-2.87) 
-7.692* 
(-3.48) 
-11.122* 
(-6.05) 
World Price (Lagged)  -0.028 
(-1.34) 
-0.029 
(-1.37) 
- - - -0.038*** 
(-1.72) 
- 
Japan Dummy (DJ) 52.233* 
(7.17) 
48.077* 
(5.58) 
61.322* 
(5.928) 
56.246* 
(6.87) 
59.068* 
(6.52) 
- 43.083* 
(6.71) 
EFTA Dummy (DE) 20.468** 
(2.60) 
20.163** 
(2.30) 
26.823** 
(2.32) 
21.563** 
(2.45) 
27.499* 
(3.03) 
21.624* 
(2.62) 
- 
Industrial Dummy (DI) x Esp - - 19.170*** 
(1.67) 
- - - - 
Income Dummy (DY) - 23.306* 
(5.03) 
- - 5.631 
(0.86) 
- - 
Intercept 59.306* 
(7.98) 
-
16.847
***
 
(-1.72) 
42.491* 
(2.92) 
55.930* 
(6.67) 
28.108*** 
(1.79) 
84.288* 
(7.66) 
71.951* 
(12.67) 
 R2 0.72 0.68 0.61 0.67 0.67 0.38 0.66 
DF 174 173 174 175 174 175 176 
 
 Gardner (1987) hypothesizes a negative correlation between supply elasticity (Esp) and the 
producer gains from farm programs in the United States.  However, this contention could not be 
supported by the cross-country empirical evidence.5  The dummy variable used to identify the 
EFTA countries was significant and so was the dummy used for Japan.  The income dummy, used 
to capture the income differential across industrialized, middle income and low income countries, 
was also found to be positively correlated with the level of protection awarded to wheat farmers.  
 
Determinants of the Political Welfare Function 
 The results reported in Table 3 indicate that including variables from both the interest groups 
increases the explanatory power of the models.  For example, model (5) is able to explain up to 
82 percent of the variation in protection levels across selected countries.  In contrast, earlier 
studies using the variables from both consumer and producer groups reported R2 values between  
                                                           
55 It may be due to the EFTA countries where supply elasticity is high (around 0.9) and average protection levels are 
considerably higher than in other industrialized countries. 
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Table 3.  The results of integrated producer, consumer and politician models 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation Technique OLS OLS OLS PCSTS PCSTS 
Engel Coefficient 4.655* 
(3.52) 
- 3.546* 
(2.80) 
2.649* 
(3.16) 
2.265* 
(2.25) 
(Engel Coefficient)2  -0.046* 
(-3.30) 
- -0.034** 
(2.54) 
-0.033* 
(-2.76) 
-0.013 
(-1.02) 
Income Elasticity- Wheat -56.648* 
(4.94) 
-49.850* 
(-4.54) 
-49.953* 
(-4.58) 
-63.833* 
(-5.33) 
-38.846* 
(-2.82) 
Relative Risk- Aversion -47.348** 
(2.34) 
-36.487* 
(-4.93) 
-32.709*** 
(-1.69) 
- - 
Per Capita Income (GNPC) 0.004* 
(4.47) 
- 0.005* 
(5.51) 
0.004* 
(7.42) 
- 
ln (GNPC) - - - - 27.855* 
(5.585) 
Factor Ratio -11.121* 
(-5.72) 
-13.551* 
(-7.21) 
-13.334* 
(-7.33) 
12.093* 
(-7.74) 
-10.702* 
(-5.86) 
World Price (Lagged) - -0.104* 
(-3.74) 
-0.148* 
(5.67) 
-0.029 
(-1.63) 
-0.029 
(-1.40) 
Government Finance 0.00007 
(1.13) 
- 0.0001** 
(2.03) 
0.00001 
(1.17) 
0.00005 
(0.63) 
Trend - 3.948* 
(3.51) 
- - - 
Dummy: Japan 35.637* 
(3.11) 
25.009** 
(2.12) 
- 29.567* 
(4.95) 
31.753* 
(5.58) 
Intercept 3.384 
(0.13) 
-7724.1* 
(-3.46) 
20.862 
(0.87) 
-8.854 
(-0.55) 
-225.58* 
(-3.95) 
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.75 0.82 
DF 171 173 171 171 171 
Note: In case of the pooled cross-section time-series estimation, the coefficient of determination is the Buse R2.  
 
20 and 35 percent only with many variables showing insignificant contribution in explaining the 
protection levels (see for example, Herrmann, 1989; Miller, 1991; Gardner, 1987).  Results 
obtained for variables associated with producer and consumer groups are similar to our results.  
 An important variable associated with the political leadership’s decision-making process – 
government finance, which states the surplus or deficit position of the treasury – had the expected 
positive sign and was statistically significant in model (3).  The time trend variable was also 
positive and significant indicating the increasing protectionist policies across the selected 30 
industrialized and developing countries.  The per capita income appeared to be highly statistically 
significant in both the linear as well as log linear specifications.  Overall, the results of this 
subsection are very encouraging.  This analysis overcomes the problem of excluded variables, 
which is prevalent in most of the earlier studies, by making a systematic 
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and comprehensive attempt that provides a broader coverage of the determinants of the political 
economy of agricultural protection across countries. 
 
Non-Nested Tests for Model Specification 
 It is often pointed out that a positive producer subsidy equivalent or an NPC greater than one does 
not necessarily suggest that the producer group has more political power, as is generally inferred 
in the PEAP literature (Miller, 1991).  Providing subsidies to farmers to produce more may be in 
the general interest of the people (Rausser and Foster, 1992).  Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1981) 
pair-wise non-nested J tests in this section are, therefore, performed to determine which group’s 
concerns overweigh in the policy formulation since it cannot be ascertained just by observing the 
sign of the protection level. 
 Two pair-wise non-nested tests were performed.  The first estimation uses the ordinary least 
squares estimation while the pooled cross-section time-series estimation technique was used for 
the second test.  The OLS and PCSTS estimations of these models yielded the results provided in 
Table 4: 
 To perform the pair-wise J tests, the consumer and producer models were then reestimated with 
alternating null hypotheses about the relative influence of consumer and producer models (Table 
5).  No general conclusion could be reached from the pair-wise J tests since the null hypotheses 
are rejected in both cases under the OLS estimation.  The pooled estimation, however, does 
provide conclusive results. 
 
 
Table 4:  Preliminary estimation results for non-nested tests 
Estimation Group Results 
OLS Consumer  c= 105.97+
3.138 ENGEL - 0.026 (ENGEL)2 - 98.864 Rc - 33.573  , 
          (7.10)    (2.38)                (-1.90)                  (-4.28)        (-2.64) 
 
Producer  p = 82.216 - 15.6 ln GDPAG - 11.913 FACTOR - 0.19 Pw, t-1 + 30.894 DI x Esp 
          (7.29)    (-4.01)               (-5.88)                   (-6.39)         (3.88) 
PCSTS Consumer  c= 103.63 +
5.169 ENGEL - 0.046 (ENGEL)2- 115.57 Rc - 46.375  , 
          (5.43)     (3.04)               (-2.58)                  (-3.89)        (-2.74) 
 
Producer  p = 71.093 - 17.542 ln GDPAG - 11.021 FACTOR - 0.042 Pw, t-1 + 30.017 DI x Esp 
           (5.73)    (-4.05)                    (-7.11)                   (-1.84)          (3.32) 
Note:  Figures in parenthesis represent t-statistics. 
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Table 5:  Results of the pair-wise non-nested J tests 
Regressor OLS Pool Regressors OLS Pool 
Consumer Model Producer Model 
 
ENGEL 2.876** 
 (2.51) 
5.215* 
(3.38) 
 
ln GDPAG -2.211 
(-0.528) 
-18.468* 
(-4.54) 
 
(ENGEL)2 -0.021***  
(1.79) 
-0.048* 
(-2.89) 
 
FACTOR -12.575* 
(-6.80) 
-11.067* 
(-8.40) 
 
Rc -48.775** 
(2.31) 
-111.34* 
(-4.09) 
 
 Pw, t-1 -0.139* 
(-4.88) 
-0.069* 
(-2.98) 
 
 -42.018* 
(-3.79) 
-48.780* 
(-3.26) 
 
 DI x Esp  10.434 
(1.30) 
21.774** 
(2.53) 
 
 p  0.824* 
(7.66) 
4.623 
(1.17) 
 
  c 0.805 
(6.02) 
9.904* 
(3.09) 
 
Intercept 22.156 
(1.31) 
95.091* 
(5.28) 
 
Intercept 36.85* 
(2.89) 
77.875* 
(6.66) 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent the t-statistics.  The parenthesized bold t-statistics are for the respective null 
hypotheses.  Under the null hypotheses, the test statistics is distributed as standard normal.  The critical value at the 
0.01 level is 2.60 at 174 degrees of freedom. 
*, **, *** represent statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
 While the test statistic reported for the mixing parameter in case of consumer model was 
statistically insignificant, it was significant at one percent level in case of the producer model.  
The pooled results, therefore, imply that variables identified in the consumer model carry 
relatively more influence in the determination of agricultural protection levels.   
 
Summary 
 The earlier PEAP studies have viewed the protectionistic policies as being the outcomes of either 
altruistic motives (SWG literature) or the self-interest motives (CHG literature). This study shows 
that the two approaches are, in fact, complementary.  Consumers’ food security concerns and 
producers’ pressure group tactics both influence the agricultural policy outcome across 
industrialized as well as developing countries. 
  Results our pair-wise J tests suggest that the pressure-group studies in the PEAP literature should 
not ignore consumer risk concerns.  This result is contrary to the conclusions reached by Variyam 
et al.  (1990) and Carter et al.  (1990) who argue that self-interest is the primary motivational 
force that explains political preferences. 
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